Guidance for California Accidental Release Prevention Seismic Assessments

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Overview

- Why a Seismic Assessment?
- Primary Earthquake hazards
- History of the Guidance Document
- Changes and Updates to 2019 Guidance Document
- Seismic Evaluation / Hazard Assessment Process
- Walkdowns
- Seismic Assessment Deficiencies

Why a Seismic Assessment?



Primary Earthquake Hazards

- Ground Shaking
- Landslides
- Liquefaction
- Surface Rupture
- Tsunami

Ground Shaking

- Result of rapid ground acceleration
- Can vary over an area due to factors such as topography, bedrock type, location and orientation of fault rupture











Liquefaction

- Can occur when seismic shaking agitates saturated ground material of certain types
- Buildings and other surface structures supported by liquefied ground can subside or tilt over
- Underground hollow structures, such as pipes and tanks, may rise to the surface due to buoyancy forces











Surface Rupture

Caused by vertical or horizontal displacement on either side of a ruptured fault, which can affect enormous areas of land (tectonic shift)









Tsunami and Seiche

- Tsunami a series of waves in a water body caused by displacement of a large volume of water, generally in an ocean or a large lake
- Seiche a temporary disturbance or oscillation in water level of a lake or partially enclosed body of water, especially one caused by changes in atmospheric pressure









Health and Safety Code Chapter 6.95, Article 2

▶ 25534.05.

(c) The regulations shall provide that the process hazard analysis shall include the consideration of external events, including seismic events, if applicable.

RMP Prevention Program Component

The owner or operator shall submit the following external events analysis information:

- (1) The types of natural and human caused external events considered in Hazard Review Section 2755.2 (Program 2), PHA Sections 2760.2 (Program 3) or 2762.2. (Program 4)
- (2) The estimated magnitude or scope of external events which were considered. If not known, the owner or operator of the stationary source shall work closely with the UPA to determine what is required. If seismic events are applicable, the parameters used in the consideration of the seismic analysis and which edition of the Building Code was used when the process was designed.

RMP Prevention Program Component

- (3) For each external event, with a potential to create a release of a regulated substance that will reach an endpoint offsite, apply sections (e)(1) through (e)(6); and
- (4) The date of the most recent field verification that equipment is installed and maintained as designed.

19 CCR §§ 2745.6, 2745.7, 2745.7.5

External Events Analysis

Natural

- Earthquake
- Flood
- Tsunami/Seiche
- Tornado/Hurricane
- Volcano

Human Caused

- Airplane/Auto/Rail
- Explosion
- Fire
- Sabotage
- Terrorism

RMP Roles and Responsibilities

- ► UPA (CUPA or PA)
- Owner/Operator
- RMP Consultant
- Seismic Assessment Responsible Engineer

Seismic Assessment Process







California Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) - 1986 to 1996

- No formal guidance for seismic assessments provided at commencement of RMPP
- Some seismic assessments were purely probabilistic evaluations
- In 1989, engineers advised the Southern California Fire Chiefs Association (SCFCA) deterministic evaluations would be better
- SCFCA stated if owners had \$100k to spend: \$10k on seismic evaluation report and \$90k on actual seismic improvements
California Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) Guidance Document

- 1990 "Proposed Seismic Assessment Guidance for RMPP Studies" developed by Structural Engineers experienced with nonbuilding structures
- In 1991 Chevron RTC Seismic Hazard Mitigation Program developed caveats for assigning "Q factors" based on structural detailing
- 1992 "Proposed Guidance for RMPP Seismic Assessments" added regulators and owners to committee per request from California OES

PROPOSED GUIDANCE

FOR

RMPP SEISMIC ASSESSMENTS

Prepared for the

RMPP SUB-COMMITTEE of the

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRE CHIEFS ASSOCIATION

Prepared by the

RMPP SEISMIC GUIDANCE COMMITTEE

June 1992



California Risk Management and Prevention Program (RMPP) Guidance Document

- In 1992, Los Angeles Metropolitan Water District (MWD) performed RMPP seismic evaluations for their facilities
- In 1993, LA MWD implemented recommended seismic retrofits (except for 2 items which were more difficult)
- On Jan 17, 1994, the Northridge Earthquake, a moment magnitude 6.7 (Mw), occurred
- MWD facilities suffered little damage, except for remaining 2 unretrofitted items

LEPC I CalARP Seismic Committee – Guidance for Seismic Assessments





GUIDANCE

FOR

CALIFORNIA

ACCIDENTAL RELEASE PREVENTION (CalARP) PROGRAM

SEISMIC ASSESSMENTS

Prepared for the

UNIFIED PROGRAM AGENCY (UPA) SUBCOMMITTEE

REGION I LOCAL EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMITTEE (LEPC)

Prepared by the

CalARP PROGRAM SEISMIC GUIDANCE COMMITTEE

January 2019

Approved by Region I LEPC on August 7, 2019



Changes and Updates to 2019 Guidance Document

- Added glossary of terms and list of acronyms
- Addressed regulatory changes
- Re-organization and consolidation
- Addressed building codes updates
- Minor seismic engineering updates and clarifications

Seismic Guidance Document

- Intended to provide a starting point for Seismic Assessment criteria
- Provides deterministic evaluation of existing structural systems and components based on understanding of performance during past earthquakes
- Major emphasis is the facility/site walkdown (borrowed from Nuclear Industry)
- Reduces, not eliminates, likelihood of a Regulated Substance release
- Relies on experience and judgement
- Meant to mitigate, not prevent, damage































Lessons Learned-Building Code Changes

- 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake
 - Creation of Acceptable Risk Policy by California Seismic Safety Commision (CSSC)
 - Tested tagging system of California Office of Emergency Services (CalOES)
 - Ground motions and soil conditions lead to near field effects
 - Identified problems with soft story, unreinforced masonry and non-ductile concrete

Lessons Learned-Building Code Changes

- 1994 Northridge Earthquake
 - Creation of California's Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD)
 - Mapping of faults is important
 - Vertical seismic accelerations can be high
 - Engineering changes for steel bracing and moment frame connection details

Example of Code Changes from Other Earthquakes

- 1999 Turkey Earthquake (magnitude 7.4)
- Along fault similar to San Andreas Fault in California
- 45 seconds of strong shaking
- Fault rupture, liquefaction, even tsunami
- Heavy industry near epicenter
 - Industrial construction typical to western codes
- Large refinery close to "ground zero"













Subsequent Code Changes

- Chimney designed and constructed in 1960's
- National Science Foundation (NSF) grant secured to determine reasons for failure
- American Concrete Institute (ACI) Concrete Chimney Committee performed separate evaluation
- Changes to detailing around breaches added to ASCE 7-10
- Adopted in 2013 California Building Code (CBC)
- Changes effective January 1, 2014



Seismic Evaluation / Hazard Assessment

- Initial vs. re-validation
- Site Location
- Age

Industry Types

- Petrochemical (Refineries)
- Ammonia Refrigeration
- Water Treatment/Municipal
- Chemical/Manufacturing

Size of Facility and Initial Seismic Evaluation Cost

- Large Refinery (<\$100,000+)</p>
- Single Refinery Process Unit or Medium Size Facility (<\$50,000)</p>
- Small Size Facility or Single System (<\$10,000)</p>




Geotechnical Assessment

- Usually performed by Geotechnical Engineer
- Ground Shaking
- Landslides
- Liquefaction
- Surface Rupture
- Tsunami





Walkdown Emphasis - General

- Review 1 to 300+ items per walkdown (depending on facility)
- Support configuration
- Damage
- Modifications

Walkdown Emphasis - Equipment

- Inadequate anchorage
- Modified supports
- Damaged supports
- Inadequate supports
- Visible excessive corrosion
- Condition of fittings

Inadequate Anchorage













Anchorage Suspect

Modified Supports



















Damaged Supports











Inadequate Supports









Suspect Bracing



Expected Bracing

Visible Excessive Corrosion










Walkdown Emphasis - Piping

- Damage to pipe supports
- Inadequate supports
- Possibilities of excessive seismic anchor movement
- Visible excessive corrosion
- Condition of fittings
- Large unsupported spans
- Short rigid span

Inadequate Supports





Possibilities of Excessive Seismic Anchor Movement





Short Rigid Span





























Walkdown Review

- Used to identify whether or not calculations are needed to complete evaluation and for what items
- Amount of calculations will depend on several factors, including experience of reviewer, size, age and condition of facility, type of construction, etc.
- Engineer may choose to evaluate several "bounding cases" or "questionable items" and use those as a basis for further assessments

DEMAND*

CAPACITY BASED ON

$$D + L \pm \frac{E_{horiz}}{Q} + E_{vert} \leq \phi R_n$$

$$D \pm \frac{E_{horiz}}{Q} - E_{vert} \leq \phi R_n$$

- "D" Dead Loads
- "L" Live loads
- "E_{horiz}" unreduced horizontal earthquake load
- "E_{vert}" vertical earthquake load
- "Q" ductility based reduction factor
- "R_n" nominal member strength
- "ΦR_n" design member strength





















Original Tank Anchorage Highly Suspect



Evidence of that Maintenance was Performed




Retrofitted Slender Concrete Table Top





Documentation / Report

- Engineer's Stamp
- Define hazards at site
- Reference prior report (if applicable)
- Walkdown summary
- Photographs
- Summary of findings/recommendations
- Supporting calculations



Walkdown Findings

No.	ltem	Comments	Photos	Recommendations
53	Sulfur Loading Rack	 Unbraced frame with 4 wide flange columns, approx. 10' tall Reported in 2014 report that the outer column that supports the loading arm is dented near the bottom. This condition was repaired by strengthening the base 2014 report mentions corrosion on the south cross beam, especially at the east end, with delamination of the flange. This has been repaired by welding new plates, leaving the delaminated flange in place 2014 report mentions that the north-south beam, on the west side near the center also appeared to be corroding and delaminating. This has not been repaired 	21-25	Repair the corrosion in the north-south beam
54	P-5009	Horizontal pump Anchored		
55	TK-1110 Fresh 49 BE* Caustic	 Unanchored tank 20' high x 15' diam. Contains caustic, so no offsite consequences per 2014 report 		
56	V-683	Anchored vertical vessel		
57	Spent Acid Rack	 4 column steel frame Northeast corner column has the base of column corroded through and concrete is damaged Northwest corner column is corroded and losing section South columns have damaged concrete 	26-33	Repair steel on northeast and northwest columns Repair concrete base at northeast column Repair concrete at south columns
58	V-836/837/838	 3 vessels end to end to create large vessel above E-972/973/974 Tall pier supports each end, 8" x 9' x 11' Called out in 2010 report to further evaluate longitudinal capacity Evaluation done as part of this study determined that supports do not have sufficient capacity for longitudinal loading. Retrofit required (see Sections 6.3 and 6.4) 	34-35	Retrofit supports for longitudinal loading

Table 2 Walkdown Assessment Findings

Walkdown Findings

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Seismic Assessment/Report



Seismic Assessment Deficiencies

- Lack of seismic assessment or report contents
- Lack of current walkdown
- Lack of seismic assessment on covered process components
- Failure to implement seismic recommendations
- Qualifications to conduct seismic assessment

Future

- Changing regulations
- Changing building codes
- Lessons learned from earthquakes and other natural disasters
- Improvements/comments to Guidance Document

Summary

Questions?

Thank you!

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